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STATEMENT THE CASE 
1. NATURE THE CASE 
This is a worker's compensation case. Liability under the Idaho Workers Compensation 
Act was admitted. In 2008, when Appellant Bryan Oliveros was a high school student between 
his junior and senior years, he had a summer job with Respondent Rule Steel Tanks, Inc., 
operating a metal press that shaped pieces of steel. He was injured on July 30, 2008, his second 
day of work, when the fingers of his dominant right hand were caught in the metal press, 
resulting in a traumatic amputation of portions of all four fingers. Appellant appeals from two 
decisions of the Idaho Industrial Commission following separate hearings. The first of the two 
decisions on appeal is the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 
November 2, 2012. Regarding that decision, Appellant challenges the determination that he was 
not entitled under Idaho Code § 72-432 to medical care in the form of prostheses for his 
amputated fingers. 
The second decision appealed from is the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order, filed August 25, 2017, and the associated Order on Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration. Regarding the underlying decision and the decision on reconsideration, 
Appellant challenges the determinations that (1) Appellant's permanent partial disability was less 
than his permanent impairment of 32% whole person; and (2) that he was not entitled under 
Idaho Code§ 72-450 to retraining benefits regarding a pharmacy technician program that he put 
successfully put himself through after the Respondent declined to pay for any retraining. At the 
time of the second hearing on February 22, 2017, Appellant remained employed by Albertson's 
in its corporate offices as a third-party coordinator processing claims for pharmacies when there 
was an issue at the point of purchase. 
Regarding the retraining determination, Appellant contends the Commission committed 
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two errors.  First, it erred as a matter of law by failing to apply the correct legal standard in 
determining the issue under Idaho Code § 72-450 of whether Appellant, “after the period of 
recovery, is receptive to and in need of retraining in another field, skill or vocation in order to 
restore his earning capacity[.]”  Second, it committed error by abusing its discretion under Idaho 
Code§ 72-450 in determining whether to “authorize or order such retraining[.]”  The 
Commission essentially concluded that under Idaho Code § 72-450 a young person with no 
history of skilled employment is not eligible for retraining, and that “there is no provision for 
rewarding individuals like Claimant who pull themselves up after a life-changing accident.” 
Regarding the permanent partial disability determination, Appellant contends the 
Commission erred by disregarding this Court’s precedent holding that benefits for permanent 
partial impairment under Idaho Code § 72-422 are distinct from and not subsumed within 
benefits for permanent partial disability under Idaho Code § 72-424.  Appellant also contends 
that the Commission abused its discretion in arbitrarily rejecting the testimony of Appellant 
Oliveros’s vocational rehabilitation expert, Douglas N.  Crum, and arbitrarily concluding that 
Appellant Oliveros has a “nonmedical” permanent partial disability of 25%.  R. 213. 
Regarding the determination regarding prostheses, Appellant contends the Commission 
committed error by arbitrarily relying upon the testimony of Dr. Gross in the face of evidence 
that his testimony was inherently unreliable. 
Appellant Oliverosrequests that this Court reverse the Commission’s determination 
regarding Appellant’s claim for prosthetic medical care; reverse the Commission’s determination 
that he is not entitled to retraining benefits and reverse the Commission’s determination that he 
did not sustain permanent partial disability in excess of permanent impairment. 
2. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Two hearings were conducted before the Idaho Industrial Commission, one regarding 
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claimant’s entitlement to medical benefits in 2012, and one regarding retraining and permanent 
disability benefits in 2017.  All benefits sought at the hearings were denied. 
3. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this case, a high-school student, Appellant Bryan Oliveros, had his fingers chopped off 
while performing a summer job.  This case once again presents an issue of law upon which this 
Court has twice overturned the Idaho Industrial Commission.   
(A) FACTS IN THE RECORD: APPELLANT OLIVEROS’S PRE-RETRAINING WORK HISTORY  
 As noted by the Commission, on July 30, 2008 Appellant Oliveros was still in high 
school when he suffered the traumatic loss of his fingers.  R. 4, Vol. 1.  At that time, he worked 
part-time in a fast food restaurant earning between $7.00 and $7.50 per hour.  During his summer 
vacation in 2008, he started a temporary summer job at Rule Steel Tanks, Inc., which also 
employed his father.  There Appellant Oliveros earned seven dollars an hour.  On his second day 
at work, Appellant Oliveros caught the fingers of his dominant right hand in a metal press 
resulting in a traumatic amputation of portions of all four fingers on his dominant hand, 
associated crush injuries and some degloving injuries on what remained of his fingers.  
Following several surgeries, Appellant Oliveros emerged with a right hand that included an 
uninjured thumb and portions of each of his four fingers.   
(B) FACTS IN THE RECORD: THE ACCIDENTAL AMPUTATION OF APPELLANT OLIVEROS’S 
FINGERS 
 In 2008, Bryan Oliveros was a high school student whose only work experience was 
some part-time work in a fast-food restaurant.  During his summer vacation, Appellant Oliveros 
started a summer job at Rule Steel Tanks, where his father worked.  Mr. Oliveros's job was 
operating a metal press that shaped pieces of steel. On Mr. Oliveros's second day of work, July 
30, 2008, he caught the fingers of his right hand in the metal press, resulting in a traumatic 
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amputation of portions of all four fingers on his dominant hand, associated crush injuries, and 
some degloving injuries on what remained of his fingers.  R. 131, Vol. 1. 
Mr. Oliveros was transported by ambulance to the emergency room where Dominic 
Gross, M.D., a hand surgeon, was on call. Dr. Gross performed several surgeries, and Mr. 
Oliveros was left with a right hand that includes an uninjured thumb, and portions of each of his 
four fingers. R. 131-132, Vol. 1.  As a result of the industrial injury to his dominant hand, Mr. 
Oliveros has very little grip or capacity for fine dexterity, A. 033, was excluded from all heavy-
duty work and was severely restricted with respect to all work involving fine motor skills in his 
dominant hand.  See, generally, A. 273-280.   
(C) FACTS IN THE RECORD: PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY AS OF MAXIMUM MEDICAL 
IMPROVEMENT 
 After Appellant Oliveros reached Maximum Medical Improvement from his injury, in an 
effort to rebuild his life as best he could, he investigated a number of vocational options.  At his 
own expense, Bryan retained vocational rehabilitation counselor Douglas Crum and met with 
him on September 18, 2009.  Mr. Crum concluded that without retraining, Bryan had suffered a 
loss of labor market access of approximately 80% and a permanent partial disability of 75%.  
See, Vocational Rehabilitation Report of Douglas N. Crum, November 16, 2009, A. 29 - 36.1  
Nothing in the record before the Commission contradicted Mr. Crum’s analysis of Bryan’s loss 
of labor market access. 
(D) FACTS IN THE RECORD: APPELLANT OLIVEROS’S VOCATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND 
REQUEST THE RESPONDENT PAY FOR RETRAINING 
 In July 2009 Appellant Oliveros was seen by vocational rehabilitation consultant Douglas 
                                                 
1 Although Claimant submitted to a vocational evaluation by Bill Jorden, an expert of Respondent’ choice, Mr. 
Jorden was not called to testify by the Respondent.  Thus, Mr. Crum’s opinions regarding loss of labor market 
access and permanent partial disability is uncontradicted, unrebutted and unimpeached. 
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N. Crum C.D.M.S. for evaluation.  Mr. Crum produced a report which included medical, 
education, and work histories, labor market analysis, and analysis of Appellant Oliveros’s pre- 
and post-injury wage-earning capacity and a discussion stating that without retraining Appellant 
Oliveros had a permanent partial disability of 75%.  A. 029 – A. 035.  Mr. Crum’s report noted 
that at the time of his evaluation, Appellant Oliveros was attending Nampa High School and 
expected to graduate in May 2010.  A. 032.  Mr. Crum noted: 
At the time of the July 30, 2008, industrial injury, Mr. Oliveros was in very good 
health, capable of performing medium and heavy physical-demand activities 
requiring frequent to continuous use of the bilateral upper extremities for gross and 
fine work with his hands. As a result of the industrial injury to his dominant hand, 
Mr. Oliveros uses the extremity mostly as a helping hand, as he has very little grip 
or capacity for fine dexterity. 
A. 033.  Mr. Crum concluded that Appellant Oliveros had lost access to 80% of the labor market 
that was available to him at the time of his injury.  A. 034.  Mr. Crum concluded that claimant 
needed retraining and that without retraining he had suffered a 75% disability.  In reaching this 
conclusion, Mr. Crum reasoned as follows: 
At the time of the subject injury, Mr. Oliveros was between his junior and senior 
years of high school, performing a summer job. Mr. Oliveros’ time-of-injury position 
paid $7.00 per hour on a full-time basis. As far as I know, Mr. Oliveros did not 
receive any employer-supported benefits. 
In my opinion, it does not make sense to use the time of injury wage Mr. Oliveros as 
a baseline for a pre and post-injury wage-earning capacity comparison. According to 
the US Bureau of the Census, using information from the US Census Department in 
2004 the average wage of a high school graduate was approximately $28,763 for 
male high school graduates. The average wage for a male worker with a bachelor’s 
degree is $50,916. 
As a result of the subject industrial injury, Mr. Oliveros will not be able to perform 
jobs similar to the work his father performs, i.e. manual laboring positions. He simply 
does not have the manual dexterity to do those kinds of jobs. 
In my opinion, under the current circumstances, it is appropriate to propose that Mr. 
Oliveros be provided with 2 years (104 weeks) of retraining benefits so that he can 
either complete an associate degree in a physically compatible career field or use that 
as a basis to go on to a higher degree.  
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*  * * 
In my opinion, the above retraining program should be considered Mr. Oliveros’ best 
means of mitigating the dramatic loss of function of all four fingers on his dominant 
right hand. Without retraining, it is my opinion that Mr. Oliveros will have a very 
difficult time finding and maintaining any sort of good-paying job in his labor 
market.  
Without retraining, it is my opinion that Mr. Oliveros’ would reasonably experience 
permanent partial disability, inclusive of impairment, of approximately 75%. 
A. 034.   
 On December 3, 2009, Appellant Oliveros’s counsel provided Respondent’s adjuster with 
a copy of Mr. Crum’s report requesting authorization for retraining. A. 037 – A. 38.  The surety 
declined to authorize any retraining.  In the Idaho Industrial Commission’s Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of July 27, 2017, A. 195 – A. 215, it makes no findings 
concerning Appellant Oliveros’s December 2009 attempt to obtain retraining. 
(E) FACTS IN THE RECORD: APPELLANT OLIVEROS’S SELF-FUNDED VOCATIONAL 
RETRAINING 
Left to his own devices, Appellant Oliveros obtained a GED in 2009 after missing too 
much school due to his injury to graduate with his classmates. R.199, Vol. 2.  Appellant Oliveros 
attended Lewis-Clark state college in Lewiston for an academic year. A. 282.  Appellant Oliveros 
worked briefly after his accident part-time at a local Dairy Queen and for about half a year at a 
Verizon call center earning somewhere between $9.50 and $10.50 an hour, however Appellant 
Oliveros was unemployed by December 2011.  After that, he unsuccessfully sought work at 
numerous banks for a teller position, call centers, and for jobs operating machines. R. 199, Vol. 
2.  Appellant Oliveros decided to retrain himself as a pharmacy technician and completed a 
course of study and an internship in May 2013, receiving a Pharmacy Technician certificate.  
Appellant Oliveros financed his Pharmacy Technician  education with the grant, student loans 
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and financial help from his parents.  Appellant Oliveros was not employed and did not earn 
income during the period of his retraining.  R. 199, Vol. 2. 
About two months after obtaining his Pharmacy Technician  certificate Appellant 
Oliveros began work at Terry Riley pharmacy in Nampa as a Pharmacy Technician  starting at 
$11.80 per hour.  Appellant Oliveros worked there for two years.  Appellant Oliveros then went 
to work at TigerDirect temporarily doing telephone sales making $14.50 per hour. R. 200, Vol. 2. 
  
After applying at numerous pharmacies and banks, Appellant Oliveros worked at 
KeyBank from February through September 2016 for $11.50 per hour and was released after a 
customer filed a complaint against him relating to a mistake that he had made.  R. 200, Vol. 2, A. 
242.  
 In December 2016 claimant found employment at Albertson’s pharmacies corporate 
offices in Boise working as a third-party coordinator processing claims for pharmacies when 
there was an issue at the point of purchase.  There claimant made since $15.87 per hour plus 
health, dental, vision, and 401 (K) benefits after three months.  There were multiple opportunities 
for advancement with Albertson’s.  Claimant continued to be employed there at the time of the 
February 22, 2017 hearing.  R. 200, Vol. 2. 
(F) FACTS IN THE RECORD: THE DENIAL OF PROSTHETIC FINGERS FOR OLIVEROS’S 
TRAUMATICALLY AMPUTATED FINGERS 
Embarrassed by the unsightly appearance of the stumps of his fingers (see, A. 288), in 
December 2009, Appellant Oliveros requested that the surety authorize an evaluation of Mr. 
Oliveros for prosthetic finger replacements.  Correspondence on this topic was carried on 
between Mr. Oliveros’s counsel and Pinnacle Risk Management between December 3, 2009, and 
November 17, 2010.  A. 37-44.    Defense Counsel contacted Dr. Gross who stated that he could 
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not recommend partial finger prostheses because they would not improve function.  R. 64, 132-
133, Vol. 1.   
Claimant sought an independent expert evaluation from Advanced Arm Dynamics, a 
national corporation that specializes only in the prosthetic rehabilitation of individuals with 
upper limb absence or loss.  Claimant was seen by MacJulian Lang, the Clinical Director of 
Advanced Arm Dynamics, a company that specializes in upper extremity prosthetic 
rehabilitation.  Mr. Lang held a Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering from Cornell 
University, a certificate degree from Cal State University Dominguez Hills in both prosthetics 
and orthotics, had completed two one-year residencies in both prosthetics and orthotics, and was 
certified in prosthetics and orthotics by the American Board for Certification.  A. 208.  Mr. Lang 
sent Dr. Gross a detailed report on April 1, 2011, recommending prosthetic fingers which he 
indicated would improve grasping and dexterity and provide necessary protection for residual 
anatomy.  Lang’s report contains photographs which may be helpful to this court in 
understanding the nature of Mr. Oliveros’ disfigurement and what the prosthetic fingers looked 
like.  Mr. Lang’s report makes it clear that the prosthetic fingers would improve function. A. 222.   
After stating that he could not prescribe prosthetic fingers because they were not 
functional, Dr. Gross had conversations with the Respondent’s representatives and apparently 
changed his opinion to a degree.  Dr. Gross wrote claimant’s counsel indicating that he would 
prescribe the prosthetic fingers if (and only if) Appellant Oliveros settled his case.  Dr. Gross 
stated that he would “be happy to write for the prostheses should he choose to have them as part 
of a settlement in this case.”  R. 100, Vol. 1.  On November 8, 2011, the Respondent agreed to 
pay for prosthetic fingers in the context of the settlement.  R. 68, Vol. 1. This offer was declined 
by Mr. Oliveros who felt that he was being forced to settle his case prematurely to obtain the 
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much-needed prostheses. 
Because Dr. Gross had indicated that he would write a prescription for prosthetic fingers 
if claimant were willing to settle this case, claimant’s counsel wrote him on December 10, 2011 
requesting that since Dr. Gross had committed in a prior letter to writing a prescription for the 
prostheses if Claimant settled this case, that Dr. Gross do so immediately so that prescription 
could be presented to the surety in connection with the settlement demand and Mr. Oliveros 
could seek other sources of funding to obtain the recommended prostheses.  A. 373. Dr. Gross 
declined to do so.  Nevertheless, Dr. Gross testified that he would support Mr. Oliveros’s desire 
to obtain prosthetic fingers for cosmetic purposes, “But if you're saying it's a cosmetic thing, I 
don't have a problem with it. And if Bryan wants it for cosmetic, I'm okay with that.”  Gross 
Depo. p. 57 1n. 8-10, A. 358. Dr. Gross and the Respondent Surety were, essentially, forcing 
Appellant Oliveros into a position where he would have to settle his case to obtain the partial 
finger prostheses.  Of course, since the Respondent had denied retraining this would have meant 
that AO would have had to drop his claim for that benefit.  In his deposition, Dr. Gross admitted 
that whether or not claimant got prosthetic fingers as part of a settlement was not of his concern.  
His excuse for his conditioning his willingness to write the prescription on Appellant Oliveros’s 
settlement of this case was “we were just hopeful that you guys would figure out what you 
wanted to do.”  A. 361.  The logical inference from this testimony is that Dr. Gross was 
supporting the Respondent Surety in the effort to see whether or not prosthetic fingers could be 
dangled over the head of Appellant Oliveros to get him to settle his case.  
(G) FACTS IN THE RECORD: APPELLANT OLIVEROS MITIGATED THE EFFECTS OF HIS 
INJURY THROUGH HIS SELF-FUNDED RETRAINING 
At the February 22, 2017 hearing, Appellant Oliveros presented evidence that as a result 
of his self-funded retraining his permanent partial disability was reduced from 75% to 55%.  
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Based upon the evidence presented from vocational rehabilitation expert Douglas Crum, 
Appellant Oliveros contended that his disability should be rated at 75% or, if Respondent were 
held to be required to reimburse Appellant Oliveros for his self-funded retraining, 55%.  The 
uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence in the record is that Claimant sustained a 75% 
permanent partial disability as a result of the accident in this case, without factoring in mitigation 
of that disability resulting from Claimant’s self-financed retraining as a pharmacy technician.  A. 
279. 
Mr. Crum’s testimony and opinions regarding the need for retraining were based upon the 
functional capacity evaluation reported by Leah Padaca, ATC-L, Ex. 2 - Crum 4-7-2016 Report 
p. 1, A. 281, and Dr. Gross’s restrictions, Ex. 2 - Crum 4-7-2016 Report p. 2, A. 282.  At the 
hearing and on appeal, Appellant Oliveros contends that the Respondent should not get the 
benefit of his retraining program. The uncontradicted vocational expert testimony at the 2017 
hearing before the Commission was that Appellant Oliveros had initially sustained a 75% 
disability which was reduced to 55% as a result of the retraining program) unless they paid for it.   
At the 2017 hearing Douglas Crum testified and both his original vocational report of 
November 16, 2009, and his updated report of April 7, 2016, were admitted into evidence.  A. 
250 – A. 269, A. 273 – A. 280, A. 281 – A.285.  Mr. Crum performed an evaluation of Mr. 
Oliveros's pre- and post-injury labor market access, using the Boise metropolitan statistical area 
labor market. This labor market is comprised of Ada and Canyon Counties.  A. 277.  Based on 
this analysis, considering Mr. Oliveros's pre-injury education, language skills, vocational skills, 
work history, and presumed pre-injury capacity for medium to heavy work, it appears that Mr. 
Oliveros had access to approximately 7.3% of the jobs in the labor market. Repeating the above 
analysis by factoring in the functional limitations caused by amputation of all four fingers of Mr. 
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Oliveros's dominant right hand, considering the restrictions given by Dr. Gross, Mr. Crum 
concluded that without retraining Mr. Oliveros had access to approximately 1.4% of the jobs in 
this labor market. This represented an 80% reduction in labor market access.  A. 276 – A. 277.  
Mr. Crum testified that in his opinion in Mr. Oliveros’s case, loss of access to the labor 
market was based upon his loss of functional capacities due to his impaired dominant hand.  
There was no loss of access to the labor market due to an intellectual component because that 
remained constant.  2017 Hearing Trans. p. 146 l. 2 - l. 24, A. 267.  Mr. Crum testified that the 
fact that a young person does not have much of a job history does not mean that they do not have 
a loss of access to the labor market.  Loss of access to the labor market in such a case is based on 
the pre-and post-injury physical capacities of the person.   
The methodology used in the field of vocational rehabilitation counseling involves some 
assumptions normally made to evaluate the loss of access to the labor market.  In Mr. Oliveros’s 
case, Mr. Crum did look at what Mr. Oliveros’s father had done historically.  Had Mr. Oliveros’s 
father been a Ph.D. professor or a medical doctor, that might have changed Mr. Crum’s analysis. 
2017 Hearing Trans. p. 138 l. 16 - p. 139 l. 18, A. 265.  Mr. Crum testified that nevertheless, Mr. 
Oliveros’s pre-injury intellectual aspirations are relevant to what he might be retrained in.  Mr. 
Oliveros might have been able to find a well-paid job in construction or in similar work, but he 
was not going to be able to do so after this accident and would need some sort of assistance to 
get them back to where he would have the means to go to college.  2017 Hearing Trans. p. 93 l. 
6 - l. 22, A. 253. 
Mr. Crum’s initial report documents the reasons that Claimant required some kind of 
retraining, having been excluded from all heavy-duty work by his injury and being severely 
restricted with respect to all work involving fine motor skills in his dominant hand.  See, 
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF 
-12- 
generally, A. 273-280.  Mr. Crum testified that Mr. Oliveros was significantly limited with 
respect to the manual work that might have given him substantial pay without retraining.  The 
functional goal was to move Mr. Oliveros to a job where he would not have to perform manual 
labor jobs that required a lot of fine dexterity with his right hand.  2017 Hearing Trans. p. 95 l. 9 
- p. 96 l. 1, A. 254.  In his 2009 vocational evaluation report, Mr. Crum outlined a retraining 
program to mitigate Appellant Oliveros’s disability which was proposed to and turned down by 
the Respondent: 
In my opinion, the only way that Mr. Oliveros will be able to successfully mitigate 
the effects of the July 2008 industrial injury is through education. Ideally, Mr. 
Oliveros should seek a bachelor’s degree. This would give him a better chance of 
being able to earn a good wage in the future. In his current state, it is my opinion 
that Mr. Oliveros will probably not be able to find a job in excess of approximately 
the federal minimum wage which is currently $7.25 per hour. 
In my opinion, under the current circumstances, it is appropriate to propose that Mr. 
Oliveros be provided with 2 years (104 weeks) of retraining benefits so that he can 
either complete an associate’s degree in a physically compatible career field or use 
that as a basis to go on to a higher degree. 
A. 278. 
Mr. Crum testified that he updated his initial vocational report on April 7, 2016, based 
upon additional information showing the outcome of Claimant’s retraining.  Mr. Crum felt that 
his 2009 projections were vindicated because the retraining at the Milan Institute in pharmacy 
technology did result in employment, a significant increase in hourly wages, and a modest 
increase in labor market access for Mr. Oliveros.  Mr. Oliveros’s retraining allowed him to 
develop skills such as customer service, cashiering, and the ability to use a computer more which 
further reduced labor market access loss from 80% to 55%.  2017 Hearing Trans. p. 98 l. 3 - l. 
15, A. 255; 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 102 l. 13 - p. 105 l. 5, A. 256; 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 106 l. 
6 - l. 19, A. 257.  Mr. Crum testified that it is more probable than not that Mr. Oliveros would not 
have restored his wage-earning capacity without his retraining.  2017 Hearing Trans. p. 105 l. 23 
- p. 106 l. 5, A. 256 -A. 257. 
Appellant Oliveros's retraining program developed transferable skills equipping him to 
obtain jobs previously unavailable to him in addition to jobs as a pharmacy technician. Mr. 
Crum testified that although Mr. Oliveros obtained specific training as a pharmacy technician, 
this only reduced his labor market access loss from 80% to 77%. However, Mr. Crum testified 
that if he considers the additional jobs that Mr. Oliveros has access to now because of his 
retraining experience in clerical customer-service-type work, his labor market access loss is 
reduced to 55%. 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 106 l. 20 - p. 108 l. 2, A. 257. Mr. Crum testified that 
Mr. Oliveros's training in the pharmacy technology program, which included customer service 
training, was helpful in is obtaining his jobs at Tiger Direct and Key Bank. 2017 Hearing Trans. 
p. 129 l. 6 - p. 130 l. 12, A. 262 -A. 263. 
Appellant Oliveros's pharmacy technician training program was instrumental in allowing 
him to obtain his present position with benefits far greater than what he was able to earn at the 
time of his injury. At the Milan Institute, Mr. Oliveros learned "Anything that has to do with the 
pharmacy world. From different types of drugs, there are classes, generic brand, classifications, 
just different things that you can use in the pharmacy world." Respondent's Ex. 2 - Second Depa 
of Bryan Oliveros p. 19 l. 23 - p. 20 l. 16, A. 341. Importantly, the body of knowledge that Mr. 
Oliveros acquired at the Milan Institute is required to do his job at Albertson's, regardless of 
where it might be obtained. 2017 Hearing Trans. p. 79 l. 15 - p. 80 l. 12, A. 250. Mr. Crum's 
summary of the benefits of Claimant's retraining is set forth at Ex. 2- Crum 4-7-2016 Report p. 
2-3, A. 282 -A. 283. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS DISREGARD OF CONTROLLING IDAHO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING 
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE§ 72-425 AND 
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CONTROLLING IDAHO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT CONCERNING PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT 
AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS 
1.1 Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in its interpretation of 
Idaho Code § 72-425? 
1.2  Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law by disregarding the 
precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court laid down in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 
Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) and reiterated in Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 
791, 795, 391 P.3d 1261, 1265, (2017) concerning the distinction between benefits 
recoverable for permanent partial impairment defined by Idaho Code § 72-422 and 
benefits recoverable for permanent partial disability defined by Idaho Code § 72-423?  
1.3 Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in effectively 
concluding that the Idaho Supreme Court intended to overrule sub silentio the basis of its 
holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) by its 
decision in Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738, (2016) and 
ignoring the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the basis of its holding in 
Corgatelli in its decision in Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791, 795, 391 P.3d 
1261, 1265, (2017)? 
2. ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION’S 2017-2018 ORDERS 
REGARDING CLAIMANT’S ENTITLEMENT TO RETRAINING BENEFITS 
2.1 Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in construing/applying 
Idaho Code § 72-450? 
2.2 Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in failing to give 
Idaho Code § 72-450 the liberal construction to which the Claimant is entitled?   
2.3 Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in concluding that the 
claimant failed to prove that he was entitled to reimbursement and corresponding total 
temporary disabilities under Idaho code section 72 – 450?  
2.4 Did the Idaho Industrial Commission abuse its discretion in concluding that the 
claimant failed to prove that he was entitled to reimbursement and corresponding total 
temporary disabilities under Idaho code section 72 – 450? 
2.5 Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in determining 
Appellant Oliveros’s permanent disability based upon a successful retraining program, 
while also determining that claimant was not entitled to reimbursement for the training 
program? 
2.6 Did the Idaho Industrial Commission abuse its discretion in determining 
Appellant Oliveros’s permanent disability based upon a successful retraining program, 
while also determining that claimant was not entitled to reimbursement for the training 
program? 
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3. ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION’S 2017-2018 ORDERS 
REGARDING CLAIMANT’S ENTITLEMENT TO PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS 
3.1 Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in construing/applying 
Idaho Code § 72-430? 
3.2 Did the Idaho Industrial Commission abuse its discretion in concluding that the 
claimant failed to prove that he was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits in 
excess of the 32% whole person impairment benefits previously paid?  
4. ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONS 2012 ORDER DENYING 
APPELLANT OLIVEROS PARTIAL FINGER PROSTHESES UNDER IDAHO CODE § 72-432. 
4.1 Did the Idaho Industrial Commission abuse its discretion in concluding that the 
claimant failed to prove that he was entitled to partial finger prostheses as a medical 
benefit under § 72-432? 
5. IS APPELLANT OLIVEROS ENTITLED TOATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL UNDER IDAHO 
APPELLATE RULE 41? 
 Appellant Oliveros requests an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 41 and Idaho Code 72-804.  Most recently, this court, citing Hoskins v. Circle A. Constr., 
Inc., 138 Idaho 336, 343, 63 P.3d 462, 469 (2003), has held that an appellant who prevails in part 
on appeal is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.  Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 
312, 179 P.3d 265, 275, (2008).  However, in Hoskins, there was a cross-appeal on which the 
respondent prevailed.  Here there is no cross-appeal, because the Idaho Industrial Commission 
ruled against AO on every issue.  While it makes sense that no attorneys fees should be awarded 
in a case in which both parties prevail on some of their issues, a party should not be foreclosed 
from being awarded attorney’s fees on appeal when justified simply because only some of his 
issues were prevailing.  The fact that only some issues were successful on appeal can be taken 
into account when determining an appropriate attorney fee award under Idaho Appellate Rule 
41(d).  In this case, the most important issue is whether or not the Idaho industrial commission is 
bound by this court’s prior decisions in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 
1150 (2014) and Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791, 795, 391 P.3d 1261, 1265, (2017).  
Because Corgatelli was not followed by the Idaho industrial commission in Davis, this Court had 
to hear another appeal construing the relevant statutes contained in Title 72, Chapter 4 of the 
Idaho Workers Compensation Act. This Court's opinion in Davis reaffirms the basis of its 
holding in Corgatelli in no uncertain terms. The defense bar, and perhaps the Idaho Industrial 
Commission, obviously disagree with this Court's reasoning in Corgatelli and Davis. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that Respondents oppose Appellant Oliveros's challenge to the Idaho 
Industrial Commission's failure to follow Corgatelli and Davis, they do so "without reasonable 
ground" which is the standard for an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 72-804. 
ARGUMENT 
1. SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE LAW 
The standard of review in cases appealed from the Industrial Commission is set forth in 
Idaho Code § 72-732 provides that this Court overturn a decision of the Industrial Commission 
where: 
( 1) The Commission's findings of fact are not based on any substantial competent 
evidence; 
(2) The Commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers; 
(3) The findings of fact, order or award were procured by fraud; 
( 4) The findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or award. 
The standard of review based on Idaho Code § 72-732 has been interpreted by this Court: 
When this Court reviews a decision of the Industrial Commission, it exercises free 
review over questions of law, but reviews questions of fact only to determine 
whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. 
Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion. Because the Commission is the fact finder, 
its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the evidence will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. This Court does not weigh the evidence 
or consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence 
presented. Whether a claimant has an impairment and the degree of permanent 
disability resulting from an industrial injury are questions of fact. 
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Funes v. Aardema Dairy, 150 Idaho 7, 10-11, 244 P.3d 151, 154-155, (2010). 
“[A]n arbitrary and capricious act by the Industrial Commission amounts to an abuse of the 
Commission's discretion.”  Cheung v. Pena, 143 Idaho 30, 34, 137 P.3d 417, 421, (2006) citing 
Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 691, 864 P.2d 132, 137 (1993).  “Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 
1979), defines arbitrary and capricious as the ‘[c]haracterization of a decision or action taken by 
an administrative agency or inferior court meaning willful and unreasonable action without 
consideration or in disregard of facts or without determining principle.’” Dexter v. Idaho State 
Bar Bd. of Comm'rs, 116 Idaho 790, 794, 780 P.2d 112, 116, (1989).  An arbitrary action has 
been defined as “a refusal to consider the evidence introduced or to make essential findings 
without supporting evidence.” Ready-to-Pour v. McCoy, 95 Idaho 510, 516, 511 P.2d 792, 798, 
(1973) (dissent) citing Inland Motor Freight v. United States, 36 F.Supp. 885, 887 (D. Idaho 
1941). 
Arbitrary and capricious action is not simply an abuse of discretion, it is of constitutional 
dimension.  The Idaho Equal Protection Clause forbids state discrimination that reflects no 
rational policy, but which is simply arbitrary and capricious action.  Thompson v. Engelking, 96 
Idaho 793, 801, 537 P.2d 635, 643, (1975).  Quoting Baker v. Carr, 82 S.Ct. 691 (1962), stated: 
Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and 
it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but 
simply arbitrary and capricious action 
Caesar v. Williams, 84 Idaho 254, 266, 371 P.2d 241, 248, (1962). 
2. THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION’S ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS DISREGARD OF 
CONTROLLING IDAHO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING PERMANENT 
IMPAIRMENT BENEFITS AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS 
Appellant Oliveros’s entitlement to permanent disability was determined as a result of the 
February 22, 2017 hearing.  Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, R.  
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195 – R. 215, Vol. 2; order, R. 216 – R. 217, Vol. 2; Order on Claimant’s Motion for 
Reconsideration, R. 222-230, Vol. 2.  The Idaho Industrial Commission held that Appellant 
Oliveros had a “nonmedical” disability of 25% and a medical disability of 32%, but that he could 
only be paid for his medical disability.  Appellant Oliveros submitted that the nonmedical 
disability found by the Idaho Industrial Commission must be paid as an additional benefit to the 
medical disability (permanent partial impairment) pursuant to this Court’s holdings in Corgatelli 
v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) and Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 
Idaho 791, 795, 391 P.3d 1261, 1265, (2017).  The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation adopted by Order of the Idaho Industrial Commission (R. 216-217, Vol. 2) and 
The Order on Claimant’s Motion for Reconsideration contain the following conclusions:  
When considering the totality of the evidence, and ignoring for now Claimant's PPI 
rating and benefits paid, which will be discussed below, it does not appear Claimant 
has suffered a loss of more than 30% of his applicable labor market, and no loss of 
earning capacity. Since earning capacity is of minor relevance when compared to 
loss of job market, the Referee finds Claimant's non-medical PPD is 25%. 
R. 213, Vol. 2.  Emphasis supplied. 
Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to payment of additional benefits for PPD 
not (sic.) in excess of the 32% PPI benefits previously paid under Idaho Code§ 72-
428.   
R. 214, Vol. 2.  Emphasis supplied. 
Claimant argues he is entitled to PPD benefits even if they do not exceed his 
impairment rating and corresponding benefits paid thereunder, citing as authority 
Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791, 391 P.3d (2017). While Davis dealt with 
the Commission's jurisdiction to enforce a compensation agreement, ruling that the 
Commission lacked jurisdiction to approve the proposed stipulation, the latest word 
specifically on the issue at hand is Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 IIC 0007 
(March 21, 2017). Dickinson is controlling law on this issue.   
R. 213, Vol. 2.  Emphasis supplied. 
As explained by Dickinson "permanent impairment," is actually only payable as a 
component of disability-less-than-total under Idaho Code § 72-428. Impairment is not a 
separately owed and payable benefit apart from PPD. Disability paid under the heading of 
"permanent partial impairment" or PPI is included, and credited against any payment 
made under PPD. Sometimes PPD will be larger than PPI, since PPD includes those non-
medical factors that impact Claimant's ability to be gainfully employed, and sometimes it 
will not. Here PPD is not greater than the PPI rating previously given. Since Claimant has 
been paid "impairment," benefits, which are actually disability benefits, of 32% whole 
person, a finding of 25% whole person PPD is subsumed within the 32% whole person 
benefit previously paid. Claimant is entitled to the larger of the disability components, 
which in this case is the PPI payments previously paid. 
R. 213-214, Vol. 2. Emphasis supplied. 
In its Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration, R. 222-230, Vol. 2, the Idaho 
Industrial Commission adopted the conclusion of law that these cases had essentially been 
overruled or limited by the Idaho Industrial Commission's own decision in Dickinson v. Adams 
County, 2017 IIC 0007 (March 21, 2017) which it declared to be "the latest word specifically on 
the issue at hand" and "controlling law." R. 213, Vol. 2. On reconsideration, stating that 
"Corgatelli cannot not be reconciled with certain language appearing in the subsequent case of 
Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho to 23, 370 P,3d 738 (2016). This reasoning conflicts 
with the fact that subsequent to this Court's decision in Mayer, and indeed subsequent to the 
Idaho Industrial Commission's own decision in Dickinson, this Court issued its opinion in Davis 
v. Hammock Management, 161 Idaho 791, 391 P.3d 1261 (2017). Davis held: 
The main thrust of Claimant's argument is that the provision in the Stipulation 
granting Employer credit for previously paid PPJ benefits was invalid under this 
Court's decision in Corgatelli, that the Corgatelli decision applies here, that the 
Commission therefore erred in approving the Stipulation, and that the PPI credit 
should either be invalidated or the Stipulation voided. In Corgatelli, the Court 
observed: "Examining worker's compensation law as a whole ... this Court finds 
that there is no statutory basis for the Commission to award [the employer] a credit 
for permanent physical impairment benefits previously paid to Corgatelli." Id. at 
292, 335 P.3d at 1 I 55. Claimant contends that the Commission erred as a matter 
of law in failing to apply Corgatelli to invalidate the credit. 
The issue in this case boils down to whether an action by the Industrial Commission 
that is not within its statutory authority or jurisdiction can stand. Ifwe were to allow 
the Commission to take action that is not encompassed within its statutory 
jurisdiction, that would permit it to do what we cannot ourselves do. In Corgatelli. 
we stated that "[a]s a purely statutory scheme, the Court cannot judicially construct 
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a credit for employers into worker's compensation law." Id. at 292, 335 P.3d at 
1155. We held that no provision of the worker's compensation law provides for 
such a credit. Id.   
Davis, 161 Idaho at 795, 391 P.3d at 1265. Emphasis supplied. 
As argued by Appellant Oliveros below: 
As Respondent point out, the rulings in Corgatelli and Davis depart from the 
interpretation of the statute that defense counsel have followed for years, because 
for years lawyers and Commissioners have misinterpreted the statute. No doubt the 
Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of the relevant statutes is a bitter pill for 
defense counsel to swallow. That may even be true for some members of this 
Honorable Commission. However, that is not justification for the Idaho Industrial 
Commission to fail to follow clear precedent established by the Idaho Supreme 
Court.  
A. 426. 
 Whatever the Idaho Industrial Commission may think of this Court’s decision in 
Corgatelli and Davis, it is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to follow them.  Indeed, this 
Court itself recognizes that obligation: 
Stare decisis requires that this Court follow "controlling precedent unless that 
precedent is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or 
overruling that precedent is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law 
and remedy continued injustice." State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4-5, 343 P.3d 30, 
33-34 (2015). 
 
Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 883, 380 P.3d 681, 696, (2016). 
If Corgatelli and Davis remain “controlling law,” the Idaho Industrial Commission must 
be reversed on this issue and Appellant Oliveros is entitled to be paid for his nonmedical 
disability in addition to his permanent impairment benefits. 
3. THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND MISAPPLIED THE 
LAW IN ITS DETERMINATION OF APPELLANT OLIVEROS’S NON-MEDICAL DISABILITY 
(A) APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 
In reviewing a decision from the Industrial Commission, the Idaho Supreme Court 
exercises free review over questions of law, but reviews questions of fact only to determine 
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whether the Commission's findings are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Hughen v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 48 P.3d 1238 (2002). Substantial and 
competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a 
conclusion. Id.   Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269, 
(2003).  Discretionary decisions are reviewed using a three-part test: “(1) whether the 
Commission correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it, and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” 
Flowers v. Shenango Screenprinting, Inc., 150 Idaho 295, 297, 246 P.3d 668, 670 (2010) 
(quoting Super Grade, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Commerce and Labor, 144 Idaho 386, 390, 162 
P.3d 765, 769 (2007)). 
(B) PLAINTIFF’S VOCATIONAL EXPERT PROVIDED THE ONLY TESTIMONY CONCERNING 
THE EXTENT OF HIS DISABILITY 
The Idaho Industrial Commission abused its discretion in determining that Appellant 
Oliveros had a “nonmedical disability” of only 25%.  This conclusion is not substantial and 
competent evidence,” but rather speculation on the part of the Commission.  The conclusion was 
not reached by an exercise of reason because the Commission dismissed the substantial and 
competent evidence of the analysis of Appellant Oliveros’s qualified vocational rehabilitation 
expert and then arbitrarily concluded that Appellant Oliveros had a “nonmedical disability” of 
only 25% without the support of any reasoning.  Even assuming that the Commission’s 
reasoning offered to justify its rejection of the conclusions of Mr. Crum meets the criteria for an 
exercise of discretion, its conclusion that Appellant Oliveros had a “nonmedical disability” of 
only 25% does not. 
The Evidence Supporting Appellant Oliveros’s Vocational Rehabilitation Expert’s 
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Opinion Was Substantial and Competent 
Appellant Oliveros presented evidence from vocational rehabilitation expert Douglas N. 
Crum. Facts relating to the evidence presented regarding Mr. Crum’s analysis of the extent of 
Appellant Oliveros’s disability, and the need for and effect of his retraining, are set forth above.  
See, p. 3 – p. 13 above.  Briefly, Appellant Oliveros was a high school student at the time of the 
traumatic amputation of his fingers and his only significant job experience was working in a fast 
food restaurant cooking and cleaning.  He had no management or supervisory experience.  A. 
277.  Appellant Oliveros had also done some landscaping work consisting of mowing grass, 
repairing sprinklers, doing some side work, and planting trees. A. 277.   Appellant Oliveros 
retained vocational rehabilitation expert Crum, who analyzed the medical records and restrictions 
given to Appellant Oliveros by Dr. Gross, Appellant Oliveros’s prior work history, Appellant 
Oliveros’s access to the labor market both pre-and post-injury and came up with a retraining 
plan.  Mr. Crum considered the restriction of Dr. Gross to work involving no fine manipulation, 
and his impairment rating of 53% of the upper extremity. A. 275.  
Mr. Crum also considered the evaluation of Beth Rogers, MD, who noted on June 25, 
2009 (approximately 11 months after the accident), that Appellant Oliveros had pain psychology 
and stated that he was actively suicidal and had depression.” A. 275. Mr. Crum noted that Mr. 
Oliveros had a very disfigured right hand of a kind likely to handicap him in procuring and 
holding employment. A. 278.  Appellant Oliveros testified that this disfiguration of his hand had 
made it three times harder for him to get a job.  2011 Hearing Trans.  p.  18 l.  3-7. A. 005.   
(Appellant Oliveros testified at the 2011 hearing concerning psychologist Michael McClay, 
Ph.D.’s 2008 report stating that Appellant Oliveros is actively suicidal.  He testified that he was 
concerned about his appearance in the future and employability, that he stopped dating after the 
accident for a year or two because his hand “grossed” girls out, and that he noticed that people 
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would not engage with him when they saw his disfigured hand. A. 008-009.)  
The Respondent Failed To Put On Any Evidence Of Its Vocational Expert’s Opinions, 
And The Commission Arbitrarily Determined The Size Of Appellant Oliveros’s Loss Of 
Access To The Labor Market In The Absence Of Substantial And Competent Evidence 
Rebutting Mr. Crum’s Testimony 
As noted by the Commission, “Respondent retained, but did not utilize, a vocational 
rehabilitation expert.” R. 207, Vol. 2.  Even setting aside the obvious inference that Respondent’s 
vocational rehabilitation expert must have found Appellant Oliveros’s permanent disability to 
have been at least that found by Mr. Crum (or he would have been called to testify by the 
Respondent), the record reflects that Respondent put on no evidence in the form of an expert 
opinion as to the extent of Appellant Oliveros’s loss of access to the labor market or permanent 
disability.   
The Idaho Industrial Commission helped the Respondent out by quibbling with Mr. 
Crum’s testimony regarding his conclusions, either by misstating the record, or by engaging in 
speculation.  Despite having declared that it accepted Mr. Crum’s factual testimony as true, R. 
209, the Commission actually rejected most of it.  For example, as noted by the Commission, 
Mr. Crum testified that at the time of his injury the claimant had access to 7.3% of the jobs in his 
labor market in Ada and Canyon Counties, and that post-accident, without retraining the 
claimant had access to only 1.4% of the jobs in his labor market.  R. 206.    Mr. Crum presented 
evidence that this represented an 80% reduction in labor market access. A. 255, 256, 278, 279, 
284.  This was not an opinion; 80% is what one gets when one divides Appellant Oliveros’s pre-
accident relevant labor market of 7.3% of the jobs in his labor market by 1.4% of the remaining 
jobs in his labor market.  From this, and the fact that Appellant Oliveros had no loss of earning 
capacity based on his prior minimum-wage job, Mr. Crum concluded in his 2009 report that 
Appellant Oliveros had a permanent partial disability of approximately 75%.  Mr. Crum’s 
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opinion that Appellant Oliveros had a permanent partial disability before retraining of 
approximately 75% was an opinion, but his testimony regarding the size of the labor market lost 
was a fact cited by the Commission, though it characterized it as an opinion.  R. 206.  Similarly, 
Mr. Crum’s second report states the facts relating to the size of Appellant Oliveros’s post-
retraining labor market as a matter of fact: 
According to the Idaho Department of Labor publication Idaho Occupational 
Employment and Wage Survey 2015 there are approximately 607 Pharmacy 
Technicians in the labor market. Compared to the general run of occupations that 
Mr. Oliveros could have performed on a preinjury basis (7.3% or approximately 
20,367 jobs), even adding all of the Pharmacy Technician jobs back into his labor 
market[.] 
A. 284 
There is no evidence in the record as to the size Appellant Oliveros’s relevant labor 
market other than the evidence given by Mr. Crum.  No motion was made (pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 67-5251 or otherwise) by anyone for the Commission to take administrative notice of the 
size of any labor market in the case. Mr. Crum’s evidence as to the size of the relevant labor 
markets based on statistical information was either evidence of the facts, or there was no 
evidence of the size of the labor market for the Commission to base its ultimate conclusion upon:  
When considering the totality of the evidence, and ignoring for now Claimant's PPI 
rating and benefits paid, which will be discussed below, it does not appear Claimant 
has suffered a loss of more than 30% of his applicable labor market, and no loss of 
earning capacity. Since earning capacity is of minor relevance when compared to 
loss of job market, the Referee finds Claimant's non-medical PPD is 25%. 
R. 213. 
As the Commission noted in its assessment of claimant’s “nonmedical” PPD, loss of 
earning capacity was of minor relevance when compared to a loss of job market.  Thus, it is 
unclear from where the Commission drew its conclusions that Appellant Oliveros had lost only 
30% of his applicable labor market.  Either (1) the Commission relied on Mr. Crum’s calculation 
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of the size of Appellant Oliveros’s applicable labor market but arbitrarily concluded that 
Appellant Oliveros had only lost 30% of that market, or (2) the Commission arbitrarily found 
that Appellant Oliveros lost access to 30% of his applicable labor market in the absence of any 
evidence of the size of the labor market at all.  In either event, it could not have reached its 
conclusions as to Appellant Oliveros’s percentages of loss of access to the labor market in 
nonmedical PPD through an exercise of reason.  The Commissions conclusions regarding the 
size of claimant’s lost access to his applicable labor market and the extent of his “nonmedical” 
were arbitrary and capricious, arrived at as the result of an abuse of discretion. 
(C) THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MISAPPLIED IDAHO CODE § 72-450 
At the 2017 hearing, Mr. Crum testified that as a result of his accident, Appellant 
Oliveros would not be able to do any sort of “higher-payed, manual-labor-type jobs or repetitive 
– or jobs requiring repetitive bilateral hand movements.”  2017 Hearing Trans. p. 132 l. 2-15. A. 
263.  Mr. Crum reported in 2009 that as a result of his injury, Appellant Oliveros would not be 
able to perform manual laboring positions, because “He simply does not have the manual 
dexterity to do those kinds of jobs.   There is no doubt that the severe injuries to Mr. Oliveros’ 
dominant hand will severely impact his vocational options for the rest of his life. … In my 
opinion, the only way that Mr. Oliveros will be able to successfully mitigate the effects of the 
July 2008 industrial injury is through education.”  A. 278.   
Mr. Crum's initial report documents the reasons that Claimant required some kind of 
retraining, having been excluded from all heavy-duty work by his injury and being severely 
restricted concerning all work involving fine motor skills in his dominant hand. See, generally, 
Ex. 1 - Crum 11-18-2009 Report, A. 273-280.  Mr. Crum testified that Oliveros was significantly 
limited concerning the manual work that might have given him substantial pay without 
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retraining. The functional goal was to move Mr. Oliveros to a job where he would not have to 
perform manual labor jobs that required a lot of fine dexterity with his right hand. 2017 Hearing 
Trans. p. 95 l. 9 -p. 96 l. 1.  A. 254. 
 Mr. Crum recommended a course of retraining for Appellant Oliveros that included going 
back to school to get an Associate degree.  A. 278.  A copy Mr. Crum’s report was sent to Carol 
Carr of Pinnacle Risk Management (adjuster for the Respondents) on December 3, 2009, along 
with a request for retraining benefits. A. 037.  This request was essentially ignored, (see, 
Summary of Requests for Authorization Reimbursement for Retraining, 2017 Hearing Exhibit 12.  
A. 303. 
 Appellant Oliveros returned to high school but did not graduate with his class.  About 
two years after his accident Appellant Oliveros obtained a GED.  Financing his own retraining, 
in the fall 2010, Appellant Oliveros attended Lewis and Clark State College for two semesters 
and one summer semester at a full-time basis taking general business classes.  A. 282.  In the 
spring of 2013, Appellant Oliveros began to study to become a pharmacy technologist, first at 
Carrington College in Boise, and then at the Milan Institute in Nampa Idaho where he earned a 
significant certificate of completion of pharmacy technology. A. 282.  After this education, Mr. 
Crum found that as a result of Mr. Oliveros is retraining is labor market access loss had declined 
to 55%, A. 284, and his wage-earning capacity had risen to $15.57 per hour based on the average 
wage for pharmacy technician.  A. 285. 
Idaho Code § 72-450 provides: 
72-450.  RETRAINING. Following a hearing upon a motion of the employer, the 
employee, or the Commission, if the Commission deems a permanently disabled 
employee, after the period of recovery, is receptive to and in need of retraining in 
another field, skill or vocation in order to restore his earning capacity, the 
Commission may authorize or order such retraining and during the period of 
retraining or any extension thereof, the employer shall continue to pay the disabled 
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employee, as a subsistence benefit, temporary total or temporary partial disability 
benefits as the case may be. The period of retraining shall be fixed by the 
Commission but shall not exceed fifty-two (52) weeks unless the Commission, 
following application and hearing, deems it advisable to extend the period of 
retraining, in which case the increased period shall not exceed fifty-two (52) weeks. 
An employer and employee may mutually agree to a retraining program without 
the necessity of a hearing before the Commission. 
The Commission misinterpreted Idaho Code § 72-450 by confusing what might be the 
fancied aspiration of an eager young worker before an accident, with what is needed to restore 
his earning capacity after an accident.  Essentially, in the absence of any supporting authority, 
the Commission held that if a person dreamed of doing something before an accident he or she 
cannot receive retraining benefits to pursue that dream after an accident, even if the evidence 
shows that it is necessary.   
Appellant Oliveros put on evidence that he was evaluated by Mr. Crum in November 
2009 who recommended, based upon his lack of job skills and the restrictions, that he be 
retrained.  See, generally, A. 277-279.  Mr. Crum’s report contains the following: 
At the time of the July 30, 2008, industrial injury, Mr. Oliveros was in very good 
health, capable of performing medium and heavy physical-demand activities 
requiring frequent to continuous use of the bilateral upper extremities for gross and 
fine work with his hands.  
As a result of the industrial injury to his dominant hand, Mr. Oliveros uses the 
extremity mostly as a helping hand, as he has very little grip or capacity for fine 
dexterity.  
Mr. Oliveros’ prior work history had consisted primarily of part-time jobs while 
attending high school. At the time of the subject injury, Mr. Oliveros was between 
his junior and senior years. It appears now that he will graduate from high school 
in May of 2010 rather than May of 2009. At the time of the injury Mr. Oliveros had 
not established a vocational goal other than he had a general interest in obtaining a 
business degree or education to become a personal trainer. 
Mr. Oliveros is a literate individual and is able to read and write in English and 
Spanish. Mr. Oliveros is able to perform basic mathematics. Mr. Oliveros has basic 
computer skills. Mr. Oliveros has no history of supervisory experience.  
A. 277. 
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Mr. Oliveros’ time-of-injury position paid $7.00 per hour on a full-time basis. As 
far as I know, Mr. Oliveros did not receive any employer-supported benefits.  
According to the Minnesota State Department of Health in a study of census 2000 
results, the percent of disabled persons households who lived under the poverty 
level was nearly 3 times that of non-disabled populations (15% vs. 6%); average 
individual earnings for disabled persons was 22.8% less ($26,978 vs. $34,951). The 
percentage of persons with disabilities who are not working was more than twice 
as high as individuals with no disabilities. Only 39.4% of people with disabilities 
worked full time on a year round basis. The poverty rate for person with disabilities 
was noted to be twice as high as the poverty rate for adults without disabilities. The 
report goes on to indicate that people with disabilities find it more difficult to 
complete post-high school education because they have less earning capacity than 
their peers.  
There is no doubt that the severe injuries to Mr. Oliveros’ dominant hand will 
severely impact his vocational options for the rest of his life.  
In my opinion, the only way that Mr. Oliveros will be able to successfully mitigate 
the effects of the July 2008 industrial injury is through education. Ideally, Mr. 
Oliveros should seek a bachelor’s degree. This would give him a better chance of 
being able to earn a good wage in the future. In his current state, it is my opinion 
that Mr. Oliveros will probably not be able to find a job in excess of approximately 
the federal minimum wage which is currently $7.25 per hour.  
A. 278. 
In my opinion, under the current circumstances, it is appropriate to propose that Mr. 
Oliveros be provided with 2 years (104 weeks) of retraining benefits so that he can 
either complete an associate’s degree in a physically compatible career field or use 
that as a basis to go on to a higher degree.  
In my opinion, the above retraining program should be considered Mr. Oliveros’ 
best means of mitigating the dramatic loss of function of all four fingers on his 
dominant right hand. Without retraining, it is my opinion that Mr. Oliveros will 
have a very difficult time finding and maintaining any sort of good-paying job in 
his labor market. Without retraining, it is my opinion that Mr. Oliveros’ would 
reasonably experience permanent partial disability, inclusive of impairment, of 
approximately 75%.  
A. 279. 
As stated above, Appellant Oliveros requested that the Respondents fund this retraining 
program, Respondents, in not responding, effectively denied that request.  A. 303-304.  
Unwilling to give up, Appellant Oliveros  financed his own retraining program.  First, he 
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attended Lewis Clark state college for two semesters and one summer semester.  Second, he 
attended Carrington College in Boise Idaho for about two months was not able to complete the 
program because of cost.  Third, he completed a program at the Milan Institute in Nampa, 
successfully earning a certificate of completion in pharmacy technology.  A. 282. 
In denying claimant retraining benefits, the Commission reasoned: 
1.   Claimant did not have an established "field, skill, or vocation" at the time of his 
accident from which he was thereafter precluded due to his injuries. R. 202. 
2.   His one-plus day's experience at Rule Steel did not imbue Claimant with skills, 
was not his chosen field, and was never considered by him to be a place where he 
intended to pursue his vocation. Instead, both pre- and post-accident, Claimant had 
aspirations to attend college after high school. Claimant's fulfilled desire of 
attending institutions of higher learning after high school hardly fits the common 
definition of "retraining into a different field, skill, or vocation." A. 202.  
3.   The next issue confronting Claimant as regards the language of the statute in 
question is the fact that he did not need retraining in order to restore his previous 
earning capacity. At the time of his accident, Claimant had a minimum wage 
earning capacity. A. 202.  
4.   Had he not been injured, there is no proof Claimant, without further education, 
would have likely started his post-high school career at anything other than a low 
to minimum wage job. While his further education certainly enhanced his earning 
ability, Claimant's earning capacity was not seriously undermined by his industrial 
accident, as admitted by Claimant's vocational rehabilitation expert. A. 203.  
5.   In the present case, Claimant was at a cross roads when confronted with his 
postinjury permanent disability and no real work skills.  He could have lamented 
his condition, maximized his perceived disabilities and focused on what he could 
not do. Conversely, Claimant could have resolved to not let his injury define him. 
Faced with these alternatives,  Claimant chose to discover his capabilities, adapt to 
his situation, further his education, and strive to make a life for himself and his new 
family. In the process, he incurred substantial educational expenses. A. 203.  
6.   Respondent should not be required to pay for Claimant's education when it was 
not pursued as an alternative to what he would have done but for his injuries. 
Respondent' obligation is defined statutorily, not charitably or equitably. A. 204.  
7.   Claimant's post-secondary education was not directed by his injury. Claimant 
had a vision of continuing his education after high school even before his accident. 
There is nothing in the record to establish that "but for" the accident, Claimant 
would have chosen a different path after high school. A. 204. 
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8.   Unfortunately, within the parameters of the Act, there is no provision for 
rewarding individuals like Claimant who pull themselves up after a lifechanging 
accident. To require Respondent to pay for schooling that was part of Claimant's 
preinjury planning even without the accident is not proper. A. 204.  
In ruling as it did, the Commission misinterpreted Idaho Code § 72-450.  First, perhaps 
most obviously, there is no requirement under Idaho Code § 72-450 and no legal authority that 
anyone, much less a high school junior, “have an established ‘field, skill, or vocation’ at the time 
of his accident from which he was thereafter precluded due to his injuries.”  The implications of 
such a rule would appear to be obvious.  If such were the case, and unskilled adult worker whose 
legs were traumatically amputated while working on a farm would not be eligible for retraining.  
Even more obviously, it is the rare case in which a minor child has a “field, skill, or vocation” at 
the time of his or her accident.  The construction placed on Idaho Code § 72-450 by the 
Commission essentially leads to the conclusion that children and those at the beginning of their 
working career are not entitled to retraining benefits under Idaho Code § 72-450.  This 
construction misperceives the condition upon which retraining benefits can be granted, that 
being, “if the Commission deems a permanently disabled employee, after the period of recovery, 
is receptive to and in need of retraining in another field, skill or vocation in order to restore his 
earning capacity, …”  Retraining benefits are available within the discretion of the Commission 
if (1) an employee is permanently disabled after recovery (2) is receptive to and in need of 
retraining in another field, skill or vocation (3) to restore his earning capacity.  Nothing in the 
language of the statute requires that the worker have a pre-injury “field, skill or vocation,” unless 
“field, skill or vocation” is construed to exclude unskilled labor.  Nothing in the language of the 
statute would support that construction.  Certainly, the Commission has not identified any such 
authority other than its own, ipse dixit.   
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 The Commission concluded that Appellant Oliveros was not entitled to retraining 
because he had some general aspirations of higher education when he was a junior in high school 
that were similar to the retraining recommended as an accident-resultant necessity by a well-
established certified disability management specialist vocational rehabilitation counselor (see 
resume of Douglas N.  Crum’s experience includes working as a field consultant for the 
Rehabilitation Division of the Idaho Industrial Commission between 1987 and 1984).  A. 305-
306.  There is no basis in law or logic for such an interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-450. 
 The Commission also contends that claimant did not need to be retrained in order to 
restore his previous earning capacity.  In reaching this condition, the Commission ignores all of 
the testimony and reports of Douglas Crum and concludes merely that at the time of the accident 
claimant had a minimum wage earning capacity.  However, the record shows that while claimant 
had essentially only received minimum wage as a high school student, his actual capacity to 
perform work without an education was far greater.   
Prior to Appellant Oliveros’s retraining, Mr. Crum reported, “At the time of the July 30, 
2008 industrial injury, Mr. Oliveros was in very good health, capable of performing medium and 
heavy physical-demand activities requiring frequent to continuous use of the bilateral upper 
extremities for gross and fine work with his hands.” A. 277.  The record contains no evidence to 
the contrary.  Before Appellant Oliveros’s retraining, Mr. Crum reported,  
In my opinion, it does not make sense to use the time of injury wage (sic.) Mr. 
Oliveros as a baseline for a pre and post-injury wage-earning capacity comparison. 
According to the US Bureau of the Census, using information from the US Census 
Department in 2004 the average wage of a high school graduate was approximately 
$28,763 for male high school graduates.  
 
A. 278. The record contains no evidence to the contrary.  Before retraining, Mr. Crum reported, 
“In his current state, it is my opinion that Mr. Oliveros will probably not be able to find a job in 
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excess of approximately the federal minimum wage which is currently $7.25 per hour.” A. 278.  
The record contains no evidence to the contrary.  Unless this Court is willing to take judicial 
notice as a fact of the assertion that an intelligent young man “in very good health, capable of 
performing medium and heavy physical-demand activities requiring frequent to continuous use 
of the bilateral upper extremities for gross and fine work with his hands” cannot earn more than 
minimum wage, there is no reasoned basis for the Commission’s conclusion that Appellant 
Oliveros’s preinjury earning capacity was limited to minimum wage.   
Indeed, Mr. Crum reported, “According to the US Bureau of the Census, using 
information from the US Census Department in 2004 the average wage of a high school graduate 
was approximately $28,763 for male high school graduates.”  Even using that figure, which is 14 
years out of date, assuming an average working year of 2,080 hours the average wage of a male 
high school graduate equates to $13.83 an hour.  In other words, Appellant Oliveros had the 
capacity to earn $13.83 an hour eventually at the time of his injury in his pre-injury condition, 
even though he had only earned minimum wage before that.  After retraining himself in basic 
college courses for year and a summer semester and his Pharmacy Technologist training in 2013, 
claimant obtained positions with Medicap Pharmacy in Nampa Idaho at $14 per hour and Terry 
Riley clinic in Nampa Idaho at $13 per hour plus100% employer paid health, dental and vision 
insurance benefits.  A. 285.  At the 2017 hearing, Appellant Oliveros testified that he was then 
working at Albertson’s corporate office as a third-party coordinator handling issues that 
pharmacy techs were having at their pharmacies making $15.87 an hour.  2017 Hearing Trans. p. 
17 l. 3 to p. 18. l. 21. A. 299-300.  The evidence was clear that Appellant Oliveros needed 
retraining to replace his preinjury earning capacity, and that the retraining was effective in 
accomplishing that.  There was no substantial and competent evidence in the record for the 
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Commission to determine otherwise.  The Commission simply arbitrarily denied Appellant 
Oliveros retraining benefits based upon its misinterpretation of Idaho Code § 72-450. 
Again misinterpreting Idaho Code § 72-450, the Commission supported its denial of 
retraining by stating, “Had he not been injured, there is no proof Claimant, without further 
education, would have likely started his post-high school career at anything other than a low to 
minimum wage job.”  This places an unwarranted gloss upon Idaho Code § 72-450; nothing in 
the statute or case law limits the determination of wage earning capacity of a high school student 
to the first job that they can obtain upon graduation. 
Similarly, the Commission misinterpreted Idaho Code § 72-450 in holding that Claimant 
was not entitled to retraining because “[he had a] vision of continuing his education after high 
school even before his accident. There is nothing in the record to establish that ‘but for the 
accident, Claimant would have chosen a different path after high school.” A. 204.  There is 
nothing in Idaho Code § 72-450 that disqualifies a person from retraining because he has a 
“vision” of bettering himself in any way.  Whatever Idaho Code § 72-450 means, it does not 
mean “Anyone having a ‘vision’ of bettering him or herself before their accident need not apply 
for retraining benefits.”   
The Commission’s denial of retraining benefits was based on a misinterpretation of Idaho 
Code § 72-450, was arbitrary, and was not reached through an exercise of reason.  The 
Commission’s decision should be reversed and remanded with instructions consistent with this 
Court’s interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-450. 
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4. THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
APPELLANT OLIVERO PARTIAL FINGER PROSTHESES 
While he was still a junior in high school 
Appellant Oliveros suffered the traumatic amputation of 
portions of all four fingers of his dominant hand.  (The 
picture to the right (see, A.  221) was taken on April 1, 
2011 by MacJulian Lang of Advanced Arm Dynamics.)  
Following the amputation of his fingers, claimant became embarrassed about his appearance and 
stopped dating.  His primary problem was that when making new acquaintances, people were 
deciding if they even wanted to engage with him because of the appearance of his hand.  He was 
hopeful that if he could get prosthetic fingers of sufficient cosmetic quality, he could get through 
the “icebreaking stage” with people.  Appellant Oliveros was diagnosed Dr. Michael McClay, 
psychologist, as being actively suicidal.  2011 Hearing Trans., p.  31 l.  6-13 to p. 34 l. 2, A. 008-
009.  
Appellant Oliveros testified at the hearing in 2011 that due to the profound psychological 
impact of his disfigurement and its interference with his attempts to find work, Trans, p. 37 l. 1 
to p. 38 l.1, A. 10, he sought partial finger prostheses as a medical benefit under Idaho Code § 
72-432.  (This disfigurement continued to be a problem for Appellant Oliveros in seeking work.  
A. 240.)  On December 3, 2009, Appellant Oliveros, through counsel, requested that the 
Respondent authorize a trial of partial finger prostheses. A. 037.  On December 22, 2009, after 
Appellant Oliveros’s initial request was not responded to, Claimant, through his counsel, sent a 
follow-up request.  A. 038.  On April 30, 2010, Appellant Oliveros’s Counsel again requested 
authorization for consultation with Brownfield's Prosthetics, which, as noted in his letter, had 
just completed a multi-finger prostheses authorized by the surety in a worker’s compensation 
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case for another client of Seiniger Law with a similar injury.  A. 039.  Again, there was no 
response.   
On August 17, 2010, Appellant Oliveros’s counsel again wrote to the surety’s 
representative confirming a telephone conversation May 20, 2010, in which the surety’s 
representative said that he would contact Brownfield's Prosthetics regarding the evaluation.  A. 
040.  There was no response to this letter.  On September 28, 2010, Appellant Oliveros’s counsel 
again wrote to Respondent’s representative inquiring into the status of Appellant Oliveros’s 
request for partial finger prostheses.  A. 41. Finally, on October 11, 2010, the Respondent’s 
representative responded by advising that he had contacted Dr. Gross’s office and was told by an 
assistant that they did not prescribe prosthetic devices for people “such as Mr. Oliveros.”  
Respondent’s representative indicated they had written to Dr. Gross asking whether or not he 
would prescribe the partial finger prostheses for Mr. Oliveros.  A. 42.   
On November 17, 2010, Respondent’s representative sent a letter witha letter from Dr. 
Gross dated June 17, 2010 enclosed.  However, Respondent’s representative stated that this letter 
was in fact not been received until mid-October.  A. 043-044.  Dr. Gross’s letter simply stated 
that he knew of no prosthesis that would improve Mr. Oliveros’s function and that he did not 
routinely recommend them “should the patient have functional use of the hand.”  A. 044.  Given 
that Dr. Gross had declined to make a referral upon the basis that the partial finger prostheses 
would not add to his hand function, Appellant Oliveros sought out an independent expert 
evaluation to determine if Appellant Oliveros might be a candidate for prosthetic rehabilitation.  
A. 045.  The report, authored by MacJulian Lang, C.P.O., Clinic Dir. of Advanced Arm 
Dynamics submitted to the Respondent on June 6, 2011, A. 047, provided a detailed list of 
rehabilitation goals, prosthetic requirements, and a prosthetic rehabilitation plan.  A. 048-053.   
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On August 30, 2011, Appellant Oliveros’s counsel wrote to Dr. Gross regarding 
clarification to make sure that Dr. Gross understood that the Idaho Worker’s Compensation act 
covered prostheses sought for cosmetic purposes and not just to restore function.  A. 055-056.  
Appellant Oliveros’s counsel received no response.  On November 1, 2011, Appellant Oliveros’s 
counsel again wrote Dr. Gross requesting a response to his earlier letter.  A. 058. 
On November 1, 2011 Dr. Gross wrote to Appellant Oliveros’s counsel stating that any 
prosthesis Appellant Oliveros might get would not improve his function, and although they 
might be for cosmetic purposes which can be important in a young patient, the patients for whom 
he had ordered partial finger prosthesis found them cumbersome, awkward and time-consuming 
to use.  Nevertheless, Dr. Gross stated that he “will be happy to write for the prosthesis should he 
choose to have them as part of a settlement in this case.” A. 061.   
On November 8, 2011 Respondent representative wrote to Appellant Oliveros’s counsel 
stating that he had spoken with Dr. Gross on several different occasions, that Dr. Gross was 
adamant that Oliveros was not in need of the devices nor were they reasonable and necessary.  
Nevertheless, the Respondent offered to pay for a “one time shot of these fingers in the context 
of a settlement.”    The letter offered no explanation as to how the fingers might be obtained if 
Dr. Gross refused to prescribe them.  A. 059.   
Appellant Oliveros’s counsel again wrote to Dr. Gross on December 10, 2011, quoting 
Dr. Gross’s willingness to write the prescription for the partial finger prosthetics as part of a 
settlement.  Appellant Oliveros’s counsel stated that he inferred that Dr. Gross was not 
categorically opposed to prescribing the prostheses, but simply could not advise the Worker’s 
Compensation surety that they were medically necessary.  Appellant Oliveros’s counsel stated 
that given this he requested that Dr. Gross prescribe the prostheses for whatever reason he had in 
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mind and agreeing to do so in connection with the settlement of the worker's compensation case.  
Appellant Oliveros’s counsel stated that he intended to present it to the surety in connection with 
the settlement demand and that Mr. Oliveros could also seek other sources of funding to obtain 
the prostheses.  Appellant Oliveros’s counsel informed Dr. Gross that even if the surety declined 
to pay for the prostheses, Mr. Appellant Oliveros wanted to purchase them if only to mask his 
disfigurement for psychological reasons to make him more comfortable in social situations 
including job interviews.  Appellant Oliveros’s counsel indicated that it appeared that funds 
might be available from other sources for the prostheses even if they were only cosmetic, a factor 
that remained in dispute.  A. 373.   
On December 19, 2011, Dr. Gross wrote Appellant Oliveros’s counsel stating that he had 
reviewed the request of December 10, 2011.  Dr. Gross stated “I have reviewed your request, and 
find I am uncomfortable prescribing the prosthesis prior to the settlement being reached. As I stated 
earlier, I am happy to write for it should Bryan wish to use his settlement to purchase a set, but I 
stand by my original statement that the prosthetic devices are not required for Mr. Oliveros to 
improve his functional use of the hand, and do not want my prescription for the prostheses construed 
as an agreement to the fact that it is medically necessary.” A. 381.  Dr. Gross made his position even 
clearer in his deposition testimony when he attempted to claim that multiple prostheses did not make 
sense.  However, Dr. Gross testified that he had not provided multiple prostheses to his other patients 
for whom he had prescribed finger prosthesis, Gross Depo. p.  75 l.  2-13, A. 363, and when asked 
whether or not he had any studies to support his testimony concerning the downside of multiple 
partial finger prostheses he admitted that he did not know of any such studies.  Gross Depo. p.  77 l.  
3-23, A. 363. 
Dr. Gross’s opinions were belied by his testimony that if it was his child, Dr. Gross 
would have supported a trial of the prosthetic fingers:  
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Q. Doctor, if you had a child who had these same injuries and that child came to 
you and said, "Daddy, I want these just because I want to look better. Kids are 
making fun of me at school," would you support that child in trying to get these? 
A. Yes. 
Gross Depo. p. 56 ln. 11-16, A. 358.  Indeed, Dr. Gross testified that he would support Mr. 
Oliveros’s desire to obtain prosthetic for fingers for cosmetic purposes, “But if you're saying it's 
a cosmetic thing, I don't have a problem with it. And if Bryan wants it for cosmetic, I'm okay 
with that.”  Gross Depo. p. 57 1n. 8-10, A. 358.   
Dr. Gross attacked Mr. Lang somewhat viciously during his post-hearing testimonial 
deposition testimony, taken at the instance of Respondent, on spurious grounds having nothing to 
do with Mr. Lang’s qualifications.  Despite the fact that Mr. Lang had an engineering degree 
from Cornell and additional training and residencies in orthotics and prosthetics, Dr. Gross 
described Mr. Lang caustically, stating, “The other thing is, is that this gentleman, with all due 
respect, is not a hand surgeon and is a salesman, and he's saying these things which are unsubstantiated, 
unfounded.”  Gross Depo., p.  32 l.  1-4, A. 352.  It was evident that Dr. Gross had no basis for 
this statement because he testified in his testimonial deposition (taken at the instance of the 
Respondent) that he had not reviewed Lang’s deposition, denying that he had received a copy.  
Gross Depo, p.  29 .4-18.  Exhibit 9 to the deposition of Dr. Gross was a letter from Appellant 
Oliveros’s counsel enclosed with which was a copy of Mr. Lang’s deposition provided to Dr. 
Gross for his review prior to Dr. Gross’s deposition. A. 376.  Dr. Gross went on in his 
excoriation of Mr. Lang, to misstate Mr. Lang’s area of specialization (upper extremities) and 
justify his complete dismissal of Mr. Lang’s recommendations and deposition testimony 
regarding the efficiency of partial finger prostheses, on the basis that Mr. Lang was not a 
professional, did not specialize in hands, but also worked on feet (an incorrect assertion as is 
obvious by the fact that Mr. Lang is the Clinical Director of “Advanced Arm Dynamics,” a 
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company which holds itself out as “specializing in upper extremity prosthetic rehabilitation,” A. 
048-0510) and was just a “salesman” because Mr. Lang’s company had allegedly delivered a box 
of fruit to Dr. Gross’s office.  Gross Depo., p.  32 l. 5 to p.  33 l.  16. A. 352.  Dr. Gross’s hubris, 
evident in this testimony, and the umbridge that he took at Mr. Lang having the temerity to have 
an opinion different than his own, must be read to be appreciated.  Before Dr. Gross became 
outraged by Mr. Lang’s temerity, or perhaps the process of being cross-examined on his 
condemnation of Mr. Lang’s recommendation without his having taken the time to read Lang’s 
deposition that was sent to him, Dr. Gross testified that he could not say if the prosthetic devices 
recommended by Mr. Lang would impede the function of the hand.  Gross Depo., p.  25 l.  10-
13, A. 350. 
By the end of his deposition, Dr. Gross made it clear in his deposition testimony that he 
had completely lost any semblance of objectivity on the issue of the prosthetic fingers.  
Notwithstanding the report that he had received from Mr. Lang describing the functional value of 
prosthetic fingers, Dr. Gross testified “it is absolutely absurd that someone would actually put in 
for fingers.  And to me, any company that would even suggest that and I will go on the record, is 
ridiculous.  It is absolutely ridiculous.”  Gross Depo.  p.  82 l.  14 - p.  83 l.  11, A. 365.  These 
are the very partial finger prostheses that Dr. Gross testified he would support his daughter in 
obtaining if she was in similar circumstances, in which he cheerily offered to write a prescription 
for partial finger prostheses if it could be part of the settlement with the Respondent. 
Appellant Oliveros moved to take the deposition of Mr. Lang for rebuttal purposes on the 
grounds that Dr. Gross said testified to an undisclosed opinion during his post hearing 
testimonial deposition that multiple prosthetic fingers such as those sought by the claimant 
created problems that single finger prosthesis did not.  R. 18-26, Vol. 1.  This motion was 
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supported by a letter from Mr. Lang indicating that he had knowledge of numerous patients who 
would use multiple prostheses for fingers for partial finger amputations on a daily basis.  (Since 
such prostheses have to be prescribed, this raises at least the inference that other physicians 
disagree with Dr. Gross regarding the utility of multiple prostheses.)  Despite the justifications 
contained in its Order Denying Motion To Take Post-Hearing Rebuttal Deposition, this motion 
was arbitrarily denied by the Idaho Industrial Commission.  R. 040-043. 
In ruling on Appellant Oliveros’s motion to take rebuttal deposition of Mr. Lang, the 
Industrial Commission criticized Claimant for not obtaining an “independent evaluation of the 
potential efficacy of the prosthesis” if they did not like Dr. Gross' opinion. R. 41.  As the record 
demonstrates Appellant Oliveros did obtain an independent evaluation of the potential efficacy 
of the prostheses and provided Mr. Lang’s deposition as evidence of it.  To the extent that the 
Idaho Industrial Commission was suggesting that claimant should have sought an independent 
evaluation from an orthopedic surgeon, out here in the real world where economic realities figure 
greatly into the equation, Claimants in a worker’s compensation case seldom have the money to 
obtain an independent medical evaluation to refute an opinion that has never been disclosed prior 
to a hearing.  It is doubtful that it “advances justice” to penalize them for not doing so.  The 
Idaho Industrial Commission arbitrarily and capriciously refused to allow a rebuttal deposition to 
be taken of Mr. Lang to explore the proposition that multiple partial finger prostheses would 
impede the function of Appellant Oliveros’s hand, raised for the first time post-hearing by Dr. 
Gross. 
The Industrial Commission denied appellant Oliveros’s request for prosthetic fingers, 
relying upon Dr. Gross’s testimony stating,  
Nothing in the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-432 would prohibit the Commission 
from ordering an employer to provide procedures or prosthetic devices that are 
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purely cosmetic in purpose. As acknowledged by Respondent, it is well within the 
ambit of Idaho Code § 72-432 to require an employer to provide, for example, scar 
revision surgery following an industrial bum or a prosthetic eye following an 
accident caused loss of an eye.  Here, however, we are persuaded by Dr. Gross' s 
testimony that the prosthetics in question would not improve; and might actually 
impede, Claimant's residual hand function. While we do not doubt that Claimant 
would prefer to have a more natural looking hand, this is but one factor we must 
consider in determining the reasonableness of Mr. Lang's recommendation. The record 
clearly demonstrates that Claimant has thrived since the industrial accident. He has 
returned to school and to gainful employment, and in both of these settings he has found 
ways to deal with his severe injury, not only in terms of his loss of function, but also 
his disfigurement. Dr. Gross convincingly testified that the prostheses are at best 
useless, and at worse contribute to an even greater loss of function. We deem these 
factors to be more important than whatever cosmetic advantage the prostheses may 
offer. For these reason (sic.) we find that the recommendation made by Mr. Lang for 
the finger prostheses is not reasonable. Respondent are not obligated to provide the 
care recommended by Mr. Lang. 
A. 139-140.  Emphasis supplied.  This finding was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore an 
abuse of discretion.  “The weight to be given expert testimony depends, among other things, on 
the expert's means of knowledge, his competency, extent of experience or study, whether the 
witness is biased, the facts upon which his opinion is based, and the integrity of the witness.”  
Stroscheim v. Shay, 63 Idaho 360, 362, 120 P.2d 267, 268, (1941).  First, the Idaho Industrial 
Commission failed to consider, and did not find any facts concerning the obvious conflict 
between Dr. Gross stating that he could not recommend prosthetic fingers for functional reasons, 
and his multiple statements that he would prescribe them if the claimant were willing to settle 
this case.  Second, on cross-examination, Dr. Gross testified that he had never prescribed 
multiple partial finger prostheses in his practice and was not aware of any articles that discussed 
any problems with doing so.  Clearly, there was no foundation for Dr. Gross’s testimony on this, 
the ultimate issue. Therefore it could not have been substantial and competent.  Instead, the 
Idaho Industrial Commission impermissibly relied upon speculation and conjecture.  Owen v. 
Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 448, 599 P.2d 1012, 1019, (1979). 
Further, nowhere in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order denying 
Appellant Oliveros the partial finger prostheses as a medical benefit under Idaho Code § 72-432 
is there any analysis of Mr. Lang's extensive testimony regarding the benefits of the partial 
finger prostheses. A. 129-141. It is unknown if Idaho Industrial Commission was in lockstep 
with Dr. Gross in discounting Mr. Lang's expertise on the grounds that he was a "salesman," but 
it does appear that the Commission was mesmerized by Dr. Gross's status as a "hand surgeon" 
and completely ignored both Mr. Lang's qualifications and substantial incompetent evidence he 
gave of the basis for his recommendations. The decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission in 
this regard was an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Oliveros was a high school student when the fingers of his dominant hand were 
traumatically amputated. It is respectfully submitted that the fact that he has been treated harshly 
by a system that promises "sure and certain relief' is beyond cavil. That observation, much as it 
needs to be made, is not the basis of this appeal. The decision of the Idaho Industrial 
Commission is appealed because the Idaho Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in 
construing Idaho Code § 72-425 and Idaho Code § 72-450, and because the Idaho Industrial 
Commission abused its discretion by arbitrarily and capriciously finding facts not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
The Idaho Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of Idaho 
Code § 72-425 by disregarding the precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court laid down in 
Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) and reiterated in Davis v. 
Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791,795,391 P.3d 1261, 1265, (2017) concerning the distinction 
between benefits recoverable for permanent partial impairment defined by Idaho Code § 72-422 
and benefits recoverable for permanent partial disability defined by Idaho Code § 72-423. It 
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erred as a matter of law in effectively concluding that the Idaho Supreme Court intended to 
overrule sub silentio the basis of its holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 
P.3d 1150 (2014) by its decision in Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738, 
(2016) and ignoring the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the basis of its holding in 
Corgatelli in its decision in Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791, 795, 391 P.3d 1261, 1265, 
(2017).  This case should be remanded to the Idaho Industrial Commission with instructions to 
enter its amended order requiring the Respondent to pay Appellant Oliveros his nonmedical 
permanent partial disability benefits without reduction for the amount of permanent impairment 
benefits previously paid. 
The Idaho Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in construing/applying Idaho 
Code § 72-450.  The Idaho Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in failing to give 
Idaho Code § 72-450 the liberal construction required under the Idaho Workers Compensation 
Act.  The Idaho Industrial Commission abused its discretion in concluding that the claimant 
failed to prove that he was entitled to reimbursement and corresponding total temporary 
disabilities for retraining under Idaho Code § 72-450 and by determining Appellant Oliveros’s 
permanent disability based upon his completion of a successful retraining program, while also 
determining that claimant was not entitled to reimbursement for the training program.  The Idaho 
Industrial Commission’s decision on retraining was arbitrary and capricious for the reasons set 
forth above.  The Idaho Industrial Commission’s decision in this regard should be reversed and 
remanded with instructions to reconsider the matter without the erroneous construction placed on 
Idaho Code § 72-450 discussed above. 
The Idaho Industrial Commission abused its discretion in determining Appellant 
Oliveros’s permanent disability based upon a successful retraining program, while also 
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determining that claimant was not entitled to reimbursement for the training program.  It also 
abused its discretion by arbitrarily and capriciously determining that claimant had a loss of no 
more than 30% of his applicable labor market in a nonmedical PPD of 25%.  These conclusions 
were speculative and not based upon any evidence cited in the record.  The Commission’s 
decision in this regard should be reversed and the issue remanded for determination based upon 
the facts set forth in the record. 
The Idaho Industrial Commission abused its discretion in concluding that the claimant 
failed to prove that he was entitled to partial finger prostheses as a medical benefit under § 72-
430.  The Idaho Industrial Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and based on 
speculation in light of Dr. Gross’s admission that he had no basis, clinical or in any studies, for 
testifying that multiple partial finger prostheses would impede the function of Appellant 
Oliveros’s hand, and, by the Commission’s failure to find facts concerning Dr. Gross’s and the 
Respondent Surety’s attempts to force Appellant Oliveros into a position where he would settle 
his case. The Idaho Industrial Commission’s decision on this issue should be reversed with 
instructions that it find facts concerning the specific recommendations of Dr. Lang’s and the 
validity of his reasons for making the recommendations for partial finger prostheses, and that in 
view of Dr. Gross’s admitted lack of foundation for his opinion that partial finger prostheses 
would not function, that his testimony is to be ignored. 
DATED July 18, 2018.  
 
/s/ Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.   
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.  
SEINIGER LAW 
Attorneys for the Appellant Oliveros 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
On July 18, 2018, I served the foregoing by fax and the iCourt system on: 
 
R. Daniel Bowen 
PO Box 1007 




/s/ Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.   
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.  
SEINIGER LAW 
Attorneys for Appellant Oliveros 
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